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Models of Messages: Three Prototypes
Abstract
This paper identifies the problem of analyses of message content as one of making specific inferences from
recorded text to characteristics of a source that are not directly observable. The problem is common to a
variety of analytical situations in the humanities and in the social sciences; and the way adequate solutions are
found therefore deserves systematic attention.
Choices among investigative techniques always imply assumptions regarding the structure of a source. In
message analysis, investigative methods crucially affect the conceivable relations between the recorded text
and the content if presumable conveys to the analyst. While there is no appropriate theory of these (basically
semantic) relations to which the notion of "message" refers, it seems that three classes of analytical constructs
of basic models of messages account for much of current investigative efforts. This paper examines the nature
and limitations of these models which are as follows:
Association models of message are identified by their use of statistical correlations as a logical basis for content
inferences from text. Whether correlations are demonstrated or postulated, such models assume that content
indicators permeate throughout a text, that the text is not purposively intended and that syntactic
constructions and their possible referentiality can be ignored. While preferred by many content analysts,
association models provide the weakest basis for content inferences.
Discourse models take linguistic references as the primary basis for inferences from text. Requisite analytical
procedures are not statistical but essentially algebaical and incoporate psychological or social constructs of the
semantic domain of a discourse. Discourse models are incapable of handling instrumental uses of language.
"Communication models of messages" refers to a class of analytical procedures that go beyond linguistic
references and/or associations by considering the behavioral constraints that the exchange of messages may
impose on a system of interacting communicators. Recorded texts then take the form of chronologies of
exchanges and communication models render such chronologies informative about the parameters of an
interaction system including the relations among the communicators and their mutual control. While
communication models are the most interesting, least is known about them. This paper therefore elaborates
only on some of their formal prerequisites.
Association models empoly familiar behavioral science methods and therefore provide so serious obstacles for
their possible computerization. Algorithms for discourse models presuppose a considerable thoretical work,
particularly in linguistics and semantics, and it is already evident that no "general discourse analyser" can be
constructed. So far attempts to computerize communication models of messages have been limited to the
most reduced situations. Further, although such models are potentially most powerful very little can be
expected from current computational technology.
The paper finally suggests that efforts should be directed toward formalizations of content inference processes
if analytical success is to be improved.
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ABSTRACT 
This paper idimtifies the problem of analyses of message content as one of 
·.making specific inferen.cces from recorded te>:t: to characteristics of a 
''SOUrcii that- a:i·e not directly observable. The problem is common t.o .a.variety 
·;of ·cmalytical<•situations in the. humanities and in the social sciences;: an<! 
·' · ~h(:,:'w1ly''adet{uate solutions are- found therefore deserves systematic .atterrtion . 
. Ghoices' arhong· 'investigative techniques always imply assumptions regarding, the· 
"structute·-·of a'som:ce. In message analysl.s, investigative methods crucially 
'affect t:hCJ' conceivable relations between the r·ecorded text and the content it 
presumable· conveys to the analyst. vlhi le there is no appropriate theory • of 
these·. (basically semantic) relations. to l·ihich- the notion of "message" refers; 
it :seems that three classes of analytical constructs or basic models of 
.!!~~,'account for muc.h of current investigative efforts, Thi;p~p~~ 
excHtline:s the na::ure and limitations of these models \·lhfch are as folloHs: 
-A§sociatiot\ models of message are identified by their use of stat is tical-
.ill>J:::xilii.:!.Qi\li:'as a logical basis for content inferences from text. Hhether 
corl.'elations are derr,onstrated or postulated, such models assmr.e that content 
indicators permeate throughout a text, that the text is not purposively 
intended and that syntactic constructi.ons and thei1: possible referentiality 
·can 'be lgnoted~. tVhile preferred by many content analysts, association models 
provide the Heakest basis for content inferences. 
Discourse models take _linguist:i,.<; J,:gferences as the primary basis for infenmces 
fi:6m' text,-·· Requisite analytical procedun's are not statistical but essentl.ally 
algehraical arid incorporate psychological or soelal constructs of the semantic 
domain of· a' discourse. Discourse models arc incapable of -handling instrumental. 
uses of language. 
·: '!Comrnuilication models of messages" refe.rs to a class of analytical procedur<?.s· · 
that 'go: beyond· linguistic refen•mces and/or associations by considering the-
bellavim:al ·constraints that the exchange of messages may impose on a system 
of· intiiractilig communicator~, ·Recorded texts then take the form-·of chrono· 
logies of exchanges and communication models render such chronologies 
'~'' 
·. h'lfc>·cn\atl.ve about the _p_arameters_ of an interaction systen1 including the 
relati.otis ·aludng the communicators and their mutual £9lltro_;h. Hhile corrnnunication 
models: are· the· most interesting, least is knOI"ll about them. This paper 
. c. c therefore elaborates only on some of their formal prerequisites .. 
··' Association-tnodcls empoly familiar .behavioral science methods and therefOJ:e .. , 
"ptovid<! sd -~el:ious obstacles for their possible computerhattou. Algor:i,thms 
·for disco<trse models presuppose a considerable theoretical work, particularly 
iti 'linguistics and semantics, and H is already evident that .no "general. 
discourse ·analyser'' can be constructed. So far attempts .to compl\terize 
communi.catl.on models of messages have been limited to the most reduced 
situations. Fui'ther, although such models are potcmtially most·pai·Jerfnl·very 
little can be expected from current computational technology. 
·The paper f:l.mtlly suggests that efforts should be d5.rected toHard fm·maltzations ·-. 
of' content inference processes if analytical success is to be improved. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this paper I want to suggest three basic models or analytical constructs 
that seem to underlie many current investigative efforts regarding the content 
of messages. By distinguishing these models, which are by no means definite 
and final, I hope to sharpen a fe'1 critical problems the solution to which 
has been avoided by traditional content analysts, mainly because of their 
habit of dealing intuitively 1vith the subject. The problem of adequate models 
is not only a matter of intellectual curiosity. It becomes crucial IVhen 
algorithms for automated analysis are sought. Here I will not presume to give 
a detailed formalization of such models, nor can I treat their methodological 
and theoretical implications in detail, I rather want to focus on the princ]J:>.les 
that go into their construction. These models thus appear quite general and 
can be treated without reference to particular communication situation: as 
prototypes, 
I admit that much of my interest in inquiries into the content of messages 
has been stimulated by the unpardonable misconceptions toward which naive content 
analysis research lends itself too easily. Space does not allow a critical 
review here; I have dealt Hith some of it elsewhere (Krippendorff, 1967). 
Because the goals of analytical approaches to the content of messages are so 
unclear, I cannot help making explicit the framework to Hhich I want to 
confine myself: 
The Hessage Analytic Situation 
For my 01vn Hork I have found it convenient to describe as follows the 
situation in which inquiries are made into message content: 
(1) In the environment of an analyst there alHays exists .!! real system, 
a source1, Hhich is singled out for attention. HoHever the boundaries of 
this source are defined, it has typically many interacting components bet1veen 
which it{formation may be exchanged. There is virtually no logical limit to 
the kind of source that an analyst may be confronted Hith: international 
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systems, political organizations, the mass media, conversational exchanges Hithin 
small groups, a system of linguistic references, cognitive interactions, etc. 
Such sources may thus be composed of neurons, linguistic items, people and 
their objects, social groups or nations. 
Source 
~ ~-----/ ~,_,~ . . 
1 Other / / 
Inaccessible 
Components 
\ 
\ \ \\ 
''\ / "'-- --- ' 6:nacces~ible ,~1 I I Components \ of Interest 1 ~~-A~~;// 
Notational System Construct 
,_{Recorded) ____ _ 
Text J 
Y Informatlon 
-- -
(Notations j J 
_ ) Referring to~---,, ______ / 
)Inaccessible( 
l States _.1 
.Diagram of the Message Analytic Situation 
Figure 1 
(2) The source is only partly observable to the analyst. Large segments 
of it remain in some measure inaccessible to his direct observation: Diplomatic 
documents represent onlyasmall aspect of international behavior; the mass 
media make available only the "front" of a vast entertainment industry; 
psychotherapeutic intervie~o~s tap only a small fraction of a patient's personal 
history, and markings on stone often are the only remains of an extinct 
but complex civilization. 
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(3) Communication to the analyst is one-Hay only, i.e., the analyst cannot 
manipulate the source and if sorced to study it unobtrusively. The 1·1ar-time 
propaganda analyst can neither request information from an enemy country nor 
is the monitored domestic propaganda directed to~;ard him; neither can the 
analyst aHare of hoH he is being studies through the medium of his 1·1ritings; and 
observations recorded during an experiment subsequently become detached and 
independent from the situation Hhich they characterize. 
(4) The analyst's problem is circumscribed by his interest in knOI·Jle<!g.so 
1;hich is not directly accessible to him: Psychoanalysts may want to identify 
the psychopathologies of a patient; political analysts may be. interested in 
f:Lnding out h01·1 the social revolution in China proceeds; students of communication 
may wish to quantitatively assess hidden gatekeeping mechanisms and psychologists 
may be concerned Hith certain latent attitudes of presidential candidates. 
(5) The analyst attempts to regard available obse_rvations, the given rm1 
data or text as messages, about _?pecific states events or phenomena of the source 
Hhich he cannot observe directly. Stories obtained during a Thematic Apperception 
Test may be utilized to infer a subject's motivation; personnlity and cognitive 
structure; domestic propaganda may become the basis for inferring Hhether a 
secret Heapon system exists; public speeches honoring a head of state may be 
processed to reveal the poHer structure within a governing elite; and research 
efforts may be directed tOHard inferring the authorship of an unsigned document 
from stylistic features, 
(6) Since the intended inferences refer to unobserved states of a source, 
a formalized language or some notations must be available to the analyst in 
terms of which the source is represented either in whole or as far as is 
demanded by the analyst's inferential problem. Psychodiagnosis presupposes 
a technical jargon by which psychopathologies are defined unambiguously; 
anthropologists l'lhO regard the remains of an ancient culture as messages 
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about its social structure 'need an adequate language in which the content of 
these messages may be formulated; political analysts of diplomatic documents 
may have to employ elaborate system constructs within which intentions, 
consequences, change of poHer structure, etc. find adequate representation. 
The analyst's notations may involve nothing more complex than a set of names, 
as is the case in problems of authorship identification; or,they may involve 
a complex syntax as may be required to describe the possible events Hithin the 
type of sources Hhich interest political analysts. 
Within this frameHork dogmatic attitudes expressed in such questions as 
to t~hat the content is become vacant. Hessages do not exist in isolation. Their 
content may be inferred by someone and in reference to some. clearly designated 
source about Hhich it becomes informative by virtue of this effort. Any 
observational data can potentially obtain message characteristics for a receiver 
to ,.,hom it appears informative. Similarly, scientific data may become messages 
to an analyst if Lhey are tre!'lte.d in such a way that valid information about 
unobserved components of a source is gained, regardless of whether data 
were generated for this purpose. This ability of an analyst to process data 
as messages about a source is ofcourse logically prior to the ability .to detect 
the message characteristics that a text may have for a particular receiver and, 
therefore, deserve special attention. It should be emphasized that contents, 
understood as objects referred to, ideas expressed, events described, or 
changes predicted, cannot be analyzed, although it may be possible to consider 
data informative about them through ~eec~f_ic ~nference~. And by the nature 
of the message anHlytic situation, the results of such content inferences are 
bound to be cast i.n the analyst's formal notations. 
The analysis of messages is then equivalent to an appropriate selection 
among the notations of a formalized language referring to possible states of 
the inaccessible components of a source (i.e. notations referring to possible 
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contents)· as a consequence of data received. Such a realization of data as 
messages about a source always involves content inferences of the type: 
IRBI'I ) 
lData.\-
(Notations ) 
.......... ····~··· . referring to·> 
. ]Inaccessible! 
l. States J 
>~hereby the process2 depicted by the arrow must be adequate J.n reference to a 
particular source in terms of ,;hich the appropriateness of the selection or 
the validity of the inference m~y be assessed. Hhile I wish to confine myself 
to only this frame1·1crk for the analysis of messages; I hope at the same time 
to stimulate a discussion about whether this is the sole analytical h·amework 
appropriate for the analysis of message content involving data. 
Evidently a large number of situations can be described in terms of the 
above frarnc~·70rk. Insofc.u:: ns this fram?.Hork provides the basis for scientific 
investigative techniques it is required that their component procedures and 
decisions be amenable to detailed methodological examination independent of 
the particular data processed. It is on this basis that traditional content 
analysis must be distinguished from an explicit processing of data ~ messages 
about unobserved phenom:~na. 
The analytical process of traditional content analysis is Hell characterized 
by Irving Janis, who suggested that it refers 
... to any technique a) for the c.lassification of the siw-vehicles 
b) Hhich relies solely upon the judgments (which, th~retically, may 
range from perceptual discrimi.nation to sheer guesses) of an analyst: or 
group of analysts as to Hhich sign .. vehicles fall into which category, 
c) on the basis of explicit:IJ: formula!_~! rules_, d) provided that the 
analyst 1 s judgments are regarded as the reports of a scientific observer 
(Janis, 1965: 55). 
It is important to notice that, Hhile the formalized language of traditional 
content analysis consists of the explicitly formulated categories of a class-
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ification scheme, the critical process of inference is never explicated and 
relies solely upon the intuitive judgments of an analyst. 
To me there can be no doubt that much of our Current concern \vith messages 
cannot bypass the judgments of qualified analysts. Their qualification may 
stem from their familiarity Hith the language, their expertise Hith the subject 
matter and from the ease with Hhich they gain theoretical insights. But. to use 
~;:,_alysts in the ~;ay traditional content analysis has done is nothing but a ,;ay 
of evading the crucial problem of explicating precisely those processes that 
account for their ability to regard a text as a message about something. 
The term "analytical procedure" can refer to only an explicated process, 
one that can be talked about in some detail, one that can be replicated ,;ilh 
a minimum of intuitive judgments, or one that has the potential of leading 
to a computer program for automatic analysis. I Hould therefore like to limit 
my concern to the making of explicit content inferences. I presuppos~ that 
data are recor(leo in textual form, and I Hish to consider a text as exhibiting 
its structure just on the basis of the distinguishability and identifiability 
of its constituent elements. 
The term message analysis may therefore be restricted to any scientific 
method for making ,'lpecific content inferences from recorded text~ 
With this definition I ~;ish to rule out from my concern all traditionr.l 
content analysis insofar as the central process of making content inferences 
relies on an analyst 1 s intuition and explicit techniques are merely used as 
aids to identifying, sorting or courting occurences in a tex/f 
The Information Requirements 
With this confinement to explicit processes I avoid discussing tHO out 
of three sources of inadequacy ,;hich affect the success of an analysis negatively. 
Let me mention them briefly. 
The most obvious prerequisite for analytical success is that the recorded text 
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accurately represent 1·elevant observations. To achieve what I 1vi 11 call 
"obBervational adequacy" is not at all an easy matter. Hhat is relevant for a 
particular analysis depends not only on the problem chosen by the analyst but 
also by and large on his kn01·1ledge about the structure of the source under 
consideration. \vhat is recorded is often neither relevant nor significant, and 
what is relevant and significant in the light of systematic theory is often 
difficult to transcribe? Since the level of knowledge about the source may change 
during the course of an analysis, the. relevance is not always determinable a priori. 
Another prerequisite which is equally important but more difficult to assess 
is referential unambiguity of notations chosen to represent content. I like to 
refer to this aspect of analytical success by the term "representational adequacy." 
Not only i.s the relevance of such notations dependent on the changing level of 
kno<·7ledge about the source, but since content is not directly observable, the 
notations refer quite of:ten to hypothetical constrncts or conceptual variables 
the representational ambiguity of 1·1hich can be assessed only indirectly (construct 
validity). 
It is possible to satisfy the requirements of observational and representational 
adequacy 1vithout making correct content inferences. There remains therefore a 
third prerequisite for analytical success. This wi.ll be called "procedural 
adequacy," and refers to the appropriateness of the inferential process in 
reference to the source under consideration. 
\vithout intending to go too deeply into the m:gument, I think traditional 
content analysis has been too much concerned with observational adequacy to the 
exclusion of the others. The emphasis on category schemes in 1vhich verbal data 
can be recorded easily, the quest for reliability Hithout cot\trol for validity as 
Hell, the voluminous and aimless counting exercises all point to negligance 
concernlng problems of repn,set~tational, and particularly procedural, adequacy. 
In 1952, Harold LassHell observed that: 
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... there is as yet no good theory of symbolic communication by Hhich 
to predict how given values, attitudes, or ideologies Hill be expressed 
in manifest symbols. The extant theories tend to deal Hith values, 
attitudes, and ideologies as the ultimate units, not Hith the symbolic 
atoms of Hhich they are composed. There is almost no theory of language 
1-1hich predicts the specific HOrds one Hill emit in the course of expressing 
the content of this thought. Theories in philosophy or in the sociology 
of knm·1ledge sometimes enable us to predict ideas that Hill be expressed 
by persons l·lith certain other ideas or soci.al characteristics. But little 
thought has been given to predicting the specific \•lOrds in Hhich these 
·.··ideas Hill be cloaked. The content analyst, therefore, does not kno1·1 
Hhat to expect (15:49). 
Procedural adequacy of a message analytic process can be assessed in terms of 
the appropriateness of the selection among available content representations in 
the light of evidence about the inaccessable states to Hhich the notations refer. 
Ross Ashby has shO\•lll that the making of appropriate selections is intrinsically 
related to the qu~ntity of information available to the analyst (Ashby, 1960). 
Indeed, many of the analytical problems with Hhich the analyst is faced can be 
regarded as problems of making effective use of sparse infOl"'!lation about the source 
he is dealing \•lith. The analyst requires a certain amount of structural information 
in order to make procedurally adequate content inferenc.es about a source. 
Given that the distinctive characteristic of messages is their informativeness 
about unobserved components of a source, and given that the treatment ofa text as 
message presupposes that the analyst has available informatl.on about the structure 
of that source, ~<e can ask four important questions: 
(1) Hhat is the ~ .. tft!Ctur_!' of the information that enables an analyst to make 
content inferences about a source? 
(2) 1!01·7 can the needed information be !'f.<Jl!i.red, and ~1hat are the criteria for 
assessing the validity of this information? 
(3) How can given information be 2P."'.':..atiQnJ11i>:<=.1, e. g. how can structural 
information be represe1~ted in algo1·ithmic form? 
(4) Hbat evidence establishes the validity or the sue~~". of the message analytical 
process as a ~·lhole? 
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Clearly, the answer to (1) is required prior to serious considerations of 
all other questions. I therefore limit mysel:tC: to a discussion of just this 
question. 
Hode ls of He_:e_sages 
Questions regarding the structure of the information that enables an analyst 
to prJcess messages are in effect questions of semantics. Since the term has 
acquired so many different shades of meaning, I want to avoid it here. But 
these questions can also be regarded, and perhaps more fruitfully so, as being 
answerable in terms of partial theories about the source as a system of interrelated 
entities, particularly theories that are predictiv.'! in both the dimensions within 
which observations are recorded and the ones within which information is of 
interest to the analyst, Since I am not concerned with particular partial theories 
that render contents for given texts, but rather with the basic structure of such 
theories, I refer to them by the term "models of message." This term then 
i.s meant to denotes structures of analytical constructs which the analyst may 
employ when regarding a given text as a message about some feature of a source. 
In the literature on attempts to treat texts as messages in the above. sense, 
essentially three mod.'!ls seem to account for most of the content inferential efforts. 
Each regards messages differently, Each has its own merits and limitations, I 
will call these models: 
(1) Association model§. of messages, Hhich realize contents in statistical 
correlations bet1veen observational variables, 
(2) Qiscours<O_ models of messages, IVhich consider contents as linguistic referents 
and realize it in denotations and connotations. 
(3) Corrununication models of messages, according to IVhich contents become manifest 
in processes of control wi.thin dynamic systems of interaction. 
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ASSOCIATION NODELS 
The General _t:!atm·e .9.£. such Nodels 
The concept~wlly simplest model for charactel·izing the message characteristics 
of a text is based on the idea of statistical association. It assumes that a 
source can be depicted adequately within a finite number 21 dimensions that are 
logically or observationally distinct for the analyst, but statistically related 
as far as the source's manifest properties are concerned. Just as the members 
of a population may be characterized by a particular set of attributes, so are 
the possible states of a source depicted as consisting of a finite number of 
components. 
Informativeness ·within association models of messages is consequently assessed 
by statistical measures of correlation. Hhen the correlation bet~<een tHO sets 
of dimensions is high then, in general, an observation on one set of dimensions 
yields information about the other set and can hence be considered a message 
about those other dimensions. The recognition of the messRge characteristics 
of some text presupposes that the analyst has kno1·1ledge about the ]EUlti.-varir,J:.<;_ 
E£Qbabili.t:_y distribution of possible events which include the text as components. 
One extremely simple and by no1·1 classical examFle of the use of association 
models for makinr; inferences from text is John Dollard and Hobart Ho1vrer 1 s study 
of the Discomfort Relief Quotient (Dollard and Ho~;rer, 1947). This quotient is 
computed from the frequencies with which tHo classes of ~;ords occur Hithin 
recorded speec~ and was found to be indicative of a speaker's state of stress on the 
ground that the extent of stress as observed and the value of the quotient 
correlated significantly. George Nahl and Gene Schul& (1964) revi.e~;ed this 
research tradition recently and showed that a host of measures such as speech-
disturbance ratios, verb~adjective ratios, and speech rates do have some 
diagnostic value to psychologists interested in information about a speaker's 
concurrent emotional states or his psychopathologies. 
Association models of messages are by no means confined to psychological 
-11-
endeavours, The classical problem of identifying ,the author of: unsigned documents 
can employ identical conceptions. Such a problem may be solved Hhen stylistic 
indices can be found that vary little Hithin and as much as possible across 
the Hot·ks of suspected authors. Hhether such stylistic indices are computed 
on the basis of the authors' voeabulary (Yule, 191;4), on certain function Hords 
(Noste.ller and Hallace, 1964), or on other minor encoding habits (Paisley, 1964), 
their informativeness is rendered by demonstrating statistical associations. 
In _!!lass media research, association models are even more prominent. For 
example, measures of the _dive'-':_,;_it:_y of J>Olitical ~!lb.Qls occurring in the major 
nC\qspapers of a count1:y have b{~.cn shmvn to be indieative of socio~economic crisE·s 
and feelings of uncertainty (Pool, 1962); journalistic assessments of sensationalism 
lead to measures that correlate highly Hith intuitive judgments regarding this 
concept (Tannenbaum and Lynch, 1960); similarly have attempts to infer the 
£f'adabilit:_y of a text resulted in the proposal of a set of indices (Flesch, 1951) 
In most studies,unfortunately, the statistical associations needed are assumed 
and rarely tested for their significance. The basic assumption of much of 
traditional content analysis has been that the relative frequency .vi th Hhich a 
certain reference is made \·7ithin a text correlates Hith the attention or importance 
assigned by a Hriter to the object referred to. 
The content inferences that association models of messages can account for 
involves: 
(a) A set of elements (recording units) that are regarded as constituents of the 
text without consideration of their sequential order within the text. 
(b) one or more measurements, mi(text), that are made on selected elements of 
the text. The measuring operation is a mapping 
(c) A set of operationally defined terms, t(state), or a variable that represents 
extratextual (momentarily unobserved) states of the source. 
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(d) rules of content inference that define a probability distribution, Pm, over 
the set ft(state) ., of terms or of possible content representations l·lhich 
·(. ··" 
is conditional on the set fm1 (text), m2 (text), ... ; of measurement·s. 
fml (text)' m2(text)' ... ] "" ·· P ( t(state) ) . 
m 
It should be noted that the conditional probability, P , is a f>:.'!qt;e!l<OY. inter-
m 
pretation of probability and the rules of content inferences are not mappings. 
A text can be said to be informative about unobserved states of a source if the 
probability distribution significantly deviates fl'om chance? 
Association models of messages thus requir·e two procedural componentS, <.1. 
measm·ement component and 1·1hat I like to call an association logic; th.e latter 
accounts for the content inferences. This may be depicited in Figure 2. 
Text · · .J Heasurerne~t] 
--·. L Association Logic 
Proeedures of Association Nodels 
Figure 2 
· , .... t(state) 
Hore or less hidden, association models appear in a variety of essentially 
different ~~esearch d_esig11_s. Naturally, conunitments to this prototype are most 
explicit in experimental approaches. For example, attempting to sho11 the 
validity of his contingency analysis, Charles Osgood (1959) set up a situation 
in ~1hich 1·10rd association structures could be measured by a standard association 
test and correlated 1·lith the results of a contingency analysis of the subjects' 
verbalizations. 
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Trying to find an ol> ject ive procedure fot· distinguishing real from 
simulated suicide notes, Philip Stone and associates Ht!re aided by a computer 
program that enumerated the occurrence of specified classes of words 1·1ithin a 
text, After inspection of the frequency tabulati.ons a decision criterion was 
developed. The above-chance frequency of success subsequently established 
its informativeness (Stone and Hunt, 1963). 
Earl Hunt's Concept Learner, on the other hand, is a computer program that 
discovers inferential information automatically. Given tHo texts that are 
differentiated according to an outside criterion, Cfor example, being for or 
agA.inst a legislative proposal\ the Concept Learner develops .:1 discriminate 
function (involving as many measures as necessary) that accounts for this 
differentiation. This discriminate function, \'/hich in fact takes the form of 
a decision tree> can subsequently be used to render a third text informative 
about the outside criterion, for example, ·Hhether it supports or rejects the 
proposal (Hunt, Harin and Stone, 1966: 159). 
PO'i•ler _£ and Lirni ta t_i ons 
Researchers assum:Lng association models for their inferences are bound to 
believe that the informativeness of a text about c~ sotrrcc' s states increases 
with the number of different measurements that are considered·. This belief is 
due to the nature of multivariate techniques which suggest that the predictability 
of a phenomenon can only increase with the number of variables observed? 
That an increase in the number of measurements does not guarantee an 
approximation of adequate inferential procedures '''as the lesson of a gigantic 
yet unpublished study designed by the Institute for Communications Research at 
the University of Illinois. The investigators took as many as 70 vnitten 
passages of about 300 words each from such varied sources as The Bible, The 
Chicago Sun-Times ar,d a manual fo1· operating a Remington type1-1riter, Each of 
these passages 1·1as analyzed in 55 different Hays. The 55 different analyses 
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had been suggested in the content analysis litcratm·e and claimed to measure 
some effects a text may have on its reader, e.g., retention, interest, Hillingness 
to read more material of a similar nature. The analyses involved simple counts 
such as ·the number of first, second and third person pronouns, various indices 
such as .readability scores; the average number of meanings per HOrd; and scaled 
judgments such as interestingness of subject matter, ho<·l Hell Hritten., In 
total, the study was a gigantic design, "a content analysis to end all content 
analyses. 1-' 
·A factor analysis revealed 10 factors accounting for some 62% of the total 
variance. But most of the factors could not be interpreted in a meaningful way. 
If valid, it was argued, the factors should at least be able to distinguish 
among texts of different sources. Positive results Here only slight. 
Then a set of texts scoring high, medium, and loH on form factors believed 
to be· meaningful Here given to readers Hho Here subsequently subjected to a 
series of tests kno,;.,n to measure interest, evaluation, comprehension and 
retention of content. Correlation of the test results Hith each of the factors 
yielded no satisfactory results, whereupon HOrk on the text variables was suspended 
(Suci and Husek, 1957). It is unfortunate that important studies are rarely 
published when results are negative . 
. No doubt that the research had been designed and executed with all necessary. 
care. ·It .seems hO'l\•lever, that association models are procedurally inadequate for 
the kind of system under scrutiny. A source that embodies processes of under .. 
stauding a text 'linguisticall_y and exhibits active interest in novel assertions 
may require models of m<essages that are more poHcrful than association models. 
Let me·point to four basic limitations of association models that cannot be 
overcome by any increase in the number of measurements made over a text. 
·First, association models treat the system under consideration as ~god_t_~ 
sources. This is due to the aggregate nature of statistical indices which are 
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computed over the occurrences of specified units 'l;·lithin a text. Discontinuities 
in the frequencies of word usc, verbal clarification of meanings and their 
consequences must escape the analysis ~·!hen \vords or phrases are enumerated with-
out regard to their position witltin a text. Unique occurrences, on the other 
hand, do not significantly contribute to correlations sought and although they 
may be informative according to some other model of messages, they disappear in 
this prototype. The use of the association model presupposes the assumption 
that the enumerated charactcerist.ics £."'.£me.".!§: the given text statistically. 
Second, association models preclude considerations of _E_efer.~ ~anil"!_~· 
So far, no statistically significsnt correlation hat hee11 sl1own to exist between 
the types of objects in a speBke·.c 1 s or \'ll"iter 1 s envjronment and the type of 
,.JOrds he chooses to use, For example, the frequent use of the term "peace" in 
a text neither indicates ,.,hether tlw ,.n:iter finds himself in such a state nor 
11hether he desires it. It does not even indicate I·Jhether he hac ever experienced 
such a state or whether he knows what it means connotatively or dcnotatively. 
Unless experintental situations impose serious constraints on verbal responses, 
inferences as to -.;;qhat a text refers to become vacuous on the basis of association 
models, Hhile undoubtedly rendering given data informative in some sense, the 
prototype has very liLtle to do Hith denotations and connotations. This fact 
cannot be emphasized strongly enough since much use of language is understood as 
being representational. 
Third, association models are incapable of making inferences about .!'_yntactic-. 
all:~: ~~pre~'!'_<)_ contents. That is to say, Hhile co-occurrence and transition prob·· 
abilities can be used t:o construct a kind of primitive grammar, association models 
are not powerful enough to consider sentential grammars. Among the most outstanding 
facts of language is that the number of sentences that a given language admits. is 
practically unlimited and that each sentence is essentially a novel sentence. 8 
A statistical treatment of S(.>.ntences becomes meaningless, hoHever, ·when 
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repetitive occurrances are rare. Attempts to force syntactically complex 
linguistic expressions into a finite non-recursive enumera~ion scheme - just to 
obtain some frequencies above one - discards much of the communicative capability 
of verbalizations. 
Fourth, association models are inadequate when a source exhibits some 
intelligence and exercises some control over its products, i.e., when the text 
is generated to satisfy a source's varying objectives, This inadequacy 11as 
first realized by George Hahl who •~as puzzled by the difficulty of inferring 
the emotional states of a speaker 11hen linguistic assertions are used instrumentally. 
He argued,11ith association models in mind, that; 
(o)ur culture places a premium on the concealment of many drives and 
affects, and at the samP time our language training and communication 
habits emphasize the importance of lexical content. Since affects cannot 
be abolished by the censorship of their expression, and since the non-
lexical attributes are not the central targets of cultural or personal 
control, it is to be expected that the nonlexical features are theoretically 
potential targets for consistent re1-1ards and punishments (and may thus) 
acquire instrumental functions .... To the extent that this is so, the 
value of the nonlexical attributes for the content analysis will decrease. 
In general, it 1vould seem to be most advantageous for the content analyst 
interested in drives, motives, etc., to select those nonlexical attributes 
that are not likely to have been influenced consistently by re1-1arcls and 
punishments in the past. The nonlexical ettributes meeting this criterion 
are those that are most likely to be most remote from m·wreness in both 
the speaker and the listerner (Hahl, 1959: 101-103). 
Although Hahl's argument refers to contenr inferences of emotional states 
only, it focuses on a general inability of association models. Bill Paisley'e 
phrase "minor encoding habits" points in the same direction by suggesting that 
stylistic indices may reveal the identity of an author only as long as he is 
unable to control their variation (Paisely, 1964). Likewise is the identification 
of psychopathologies conditional upon the inability of patients to manipulate 
the symptoms to his advantage. 
This limitation may be turned into an analytical advantage when correlations 
are found of 1-~hich the source is essentially unaware. But, association. models 
have very little to do with ho1·1 language is normally used and what speakers of a 
language express in its terms, 
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DISCOURSE NODELS 
The Domain of .!!_ueh Hod~_ls 
I argued that associatl.on models of messages are inadequate 1·1hen there is 
reason to believe that the message characteristics of a given text are language-
like, Hhen a text can be assumed to refer to, rather than correlate Hith unobserved 
states of a soUrce, and Hhen message contents a1·e in some significant sense 
novel as is most typically the case in human communication, Nm< I will argue for 
a more poHerful model - one Hhich treats messages as discourse. First, some 
features of disco.nse as I see them: 
(1) Typical discourses such as a political speech, a set of private lette,rs, 
a monograph, a ne11s report, a fairy tale or a scholarly treatise can essentially 
be considered as describing extralinguistic phenomena, as talking about events 
or representing ideas that can potentially be found Hithin a source. I.e., some 
JOvoords occurring in the discourse are names and refer tq, denote, or connote non-
linguistic objects or c.oncepts, Some sentences are statements about observed 
or fictional events and descriptions typically require more than one sentence. 
(2) Such discourses may be thought of as generating their OHn parameters, 
delineating relevomt issues and defining the meenings of terms in Hhich ·unobserved 
phenomena are represented. Insofar as this is the case,sentences of a discourse 
may not be taken in isolation. 
(3) Such dis<:ourses are either the product of one person o1· c.omposed in 
such a Hay that it is essentially free of inconsistencies or contradiction 
Hithin that discourse and in reference to the source, That is not to say that an 
analyst may net disc.over logical gaps or fallacies in the arguments but that the 
discourse may be said to be consistent Hith the speaker 1 s or 1-n·iter' s point o£ 
vie~<, ideological orientation or ideosyncratl.c logic. 
The aim of discourse models of messages then is to account for a reader's 
ability to understand what:_!! discourse is about, more specifically, his ability 
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to respond to questions about the source that are pertinent to the analyst and 
can be ansHered from a linguistic interpretation of the text. This ability 
requires an adequate symbolic manipulation of Hhat a text implicitly or explicitly 
describes, and involves both the paraJ>hrasing of such information in the 
analyst's unambiguous notations and the J.nferri.n_g from this information whatever 
the analyst wants to know about the source. 
·.·· Since I n0\·1 consider both the formal terms referring to the possible contents 
of interest to the analyst, and the given text, to be representational, in order 
to avoJ.d confusion, I should mention two extreme cases of content inferences. 
The simplest situation is one in 1·1hich the text i.s already cast in the analyst 1 s 
terms, thus making paraphrasing superfluous and reducing inferences to logical" 
implications~ lloHever, the most difficult situation arises when the given text 
takes the form of a language foreign to the one in terms of 1vhich the analyst 
"~;·7ishC's to represent his results. Discourse models 'Hill then have to account for 
a translation in Hhich the relevant referential content of the discourse remains 
invariant and irrelevant representations are suppressed in the course of the process. 
Happily, practical situa~ions of message analysis are more likely to be 
concerned 1-1llhatext that is recorded in a form closely related to the analyst's 
output language, <r.nglish for example), and the major task of discourse models 
becomes merely one of extracting relevant information from a text and of mald.ng 
content inferences from such information. 
Unlike association model<J, discourse models involve the consideration of 
linguistic meanings. In this respect the goal of discourse models overlaps 
with the aims of linguistic theory but Hill have to go beyond it, as I Hill sho1v. 
Discourse models must c.onsist of at least three components ~;hich I ~;ould like to 
call grammar, kernelization, and discou~ J.c>gic. Ho1-1 these components are 
procedurally related may be, seen in Figure 3 which includes abbreviations ·that 
Hill become clear later. Let me outline some of the respective features of 
these c.omponents: 
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Text"" -
sr 
Procedures of Discourse Models 
Figure 3 
According to the transformational school of thought, the aim of a linguistic 
theory of languege is to fine! adequate representations for the structural inform"· 
tion speakers enrploy in analyzing and generatJng verbali~ati.ons. The Confinement 
to structural i.DformatAon ahout .!! language is crucial for linguists because 
the information that a language may represent knows virtually no limitation. 
Jerry Fodor~ J!l. conceive of the granunar of a language that represents a 
native's linguistic ability as having three part::> ·· a syntax, a ncmantics, and 
a phonology (Fodor, Jenkins and Saporta, 1967). Hhen text is written the 
phonological part becomes superfluous. The syntactic part is thought of as a 
device that either generates a set of represeatations of all and only the well-
formed sentences of a language or assigns to each sentence proper a set of 
de script ions accounting for the possible ways th<e sentence could have been 
generated by that device. Jerold Katz and Jerry Fodor conceptualize the 
semantics of a language as consisting of a lexical dictionary and projection 
rules, The lexical dictionary provides an entry for each lexical item in a 
sentence and lir.ts its possible meanings or senses, relevant semantic dimensions 
and their use. And the projection rules provide the basis for amalgamating 
syntactic descriptions and meanings to obtain the possible semantic descriptions 
or readings of a sentence ·(Katz and Fodor, 1964). Accordingly, the function 
of the granm1ar of a language is to determine the number and kind of readings 
-20-
a native speaker 1o1ould give to each sentence. For example the sentence: 
Time flies like an arrow 
may be found to be syntactically normal and to have three semantic readings: 
(1) there is a species called "time flies" that prefers arro,.,s; (2) a request 
is made to time the flies as quickly as possible; (3) time moves very SHiftly. 
(It· should be noted that the paraphrased content Hhich I used to exhibit the 
different readings is not a product of a grammar which would indicate only that 
"time flies", for example, is a legitimate noun phrase in English). 
A grammar is thus considered as accounting for the process that can be 
depicted as follows: 
where d(s) is a semantic interpretation of the sentence s of a text. At this 
stage of linguistic theo1-y, such gramma1·s are still quite complex and not at 
all perfect, But their function within a discourse model becomes clear if one 
keeps in mind (1) that information about the physical or social environment of a 
speaker is not incorporated in a granmwr, and (2) that meanings are not considered 
above the sentence level. Consequently, the lexical dictionary characterizes 
the use of linguistic items intralinguistically, i.e. it _lists meanings or 
intentional semantic interpretations, and not the possible referents of those items. 
ThG projection rules select among those meanings to satisfy the particular 
sentential contexts within 1vhich the item occurred. Since there are numerous 
words that have meaning but no referent, e.g., 11 maybe," "or," 11hello, 11 "ether," 
but the conversG does not exist, a consideration of intralinguistic uses of 
linguistic items precedes that of their possible references. Likewise, semantic 
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descriptions of sentences clearly precede characterizations of their contents~0 
The Discourse _hogic Component:_ 
Since the aim of message analysis is to obtain information from given text 
about some unobserved part of a source of interest to the analyst, grammar alone 
will not suffice. The extensionality of its output is uncertain. \olhat discourse 
moclels have to account for is a reader's ability to understand the sentences of 
a discourse referentially. One test of this ability v~uld involve pointing to 
the objects to which a text may refer. Since this is impossible by virtue of 
the message analytic situation, the only other t~est is that the reader be abloe 
to draw inferences from the text which are both valid in reference to the soctrce 
and relevant regarding the analyst's problem. To acconq,lish such infen>nces it 
seems necessary that the speaker have in additi~on to ·his familiarity with the 
language some basic kno1;ledge about the subject matter of the discourse, i.e., 
he must employ extralinguistic information. 
Understanding the referential content of sentences may become manifest 
in a speaker 1 s a hili ty to infer, for example, from the two sentences: 
Nark Twain is the author of Huckleberry Finn~ 
Samuel Clemens lived in Hannibal 
that the author of Huckleberry Finn lived in Hannibal, Hhich presupposes informa-
tion about the identity of references. The information that justifies the 
inference from: 
Robert has a driver's license. 
that Robert is above 16 years of age (depending on the state), not blind, knows 
how to drive a car, can identify traffic signs, etc., represents knowledge about 
a set of properties that are antecedent to the one referred to in the sentence, 
From: 
Jim sa1v his son Bill 
Nary and Jim are married 
Sam's mother Nary smokes 
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it is not difficult to infer that Bill and Sam a:ce brothers, provided that some 
information about kinship relations is available. Similarly, even the obvious 
inference from "A is larger than B, B is larger than C" to "A is larger than C" 
presupposes information about the transitivity of the relation "is larger than." 
On the other hand, the relation "is father of~~. has quite different properties 
"hich must be known in order to make content inferences that are adequate in 
reference to the source under consideration. 
These examples show that the information that must be supplied by the reader 
in order to demonstrate his ability t·o understand the sentences of a discourse 
represent structural features_ of the source patterns or functions that may hold 
for classes of the source's states. The component that accounts for a reader's 
ability to make adequate inferences from given sentences may be called "slisc:ourse 
logic." It can be considered the most distinctive feature of discourse models 
of messages. The discourse logic component suggests that a distinction be 
drmm between tv7o kinds of sentences 
(a) State descriptions, 11 st," or sentences that refer to particular states of 
the source and 
(b) Structure descriptions, "sr," or sentences that refer to relations among 
states or classes of states of the source. 
(c) The rules of_ content inference that are permissable >•Tithin a discourse logic 
are then of the deductive type, e.g. 
The discourse logic of such models thus produces new state descriptions that 
are logically implied by the text. Hhether the required structure descriptions 
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are exclusively extracted from the text or Hhether they are incorporated into 
the mw.lytical process prior to the analysis, t)le adequacy of the inferences 
made is uniquely determined by them. A discourse logic evidently presupposes that 
the text is kernelized and of such a canonical form that the collection of 
descriptions represents the relevant content of the text as a Hhole. HoH this 
may be accomplished is suggested belol'l. 
The· 'Kernelization Componen~ 
Discourse logic essentially requires a set of statements in a canonical form, 
---
i.e., each state description or structure description must be of such a form 
that it can be taken out of eontext and be used as a basis of discourse logical 
inferences. A grammar, on the other hand, provides semant~~c characterizations 
for each sentence the content: of Hhich is in s0me significant l·my dependent on 
context. The input of the kernel.ization component can therefore be considered fl. 
string of concatenated sets of semantic descriptions for each sentence C?Ccurring 
in the text. Its major aim becomes one of breaking a semantically interpreted 
text into eontext independent units and of transforming these units into the 
canonical form of state or structure descriptions. Let me be more specific about 
this aim. 
First, one of the important features of discourses, 11ith implications for 
the construction of a granunar, is their ability explicitly to define or 
implicitly to modify the meanings of tenns occurring in the very same discourse. 
Such definitions or modifications may affect subsequent readings of a sentence 
in a Hay not normally considered IVhen interpreted out of context. I cannot fully 
agree l·lith Katz and Fodor 1·1hen they assume that a grammar provides a set of 
alternative semantic interpretations of a sentence among 1·1hich a speaker may merely 
select on the basis of his knowledge about the ;>hysical setting in which the 
sentence was uttered. At least as far as the expression of referential content is 
concerned, language is a very flexible device. Although it is easy to imagine 
a story, let us say, in Hhich the sentence: 
Careless little dogs sleep quietly 
is informative about some state of affairs, it is not at all impossible to find 
or construct a discourse Hithin Hhich the grammatically normal sentence: 
Colorless green idea$ sleep furiously 
becomes not only meaningfulll but has content as well. The granunar that Katz 
and Fodor suggest 1wuld be insensitive to linguistic environments which may 
specify the meanings of such a sentence's components and would not assign any 
semantic description to the latter sentence. It is only \•1hen such sentences 
are taken Hithout their linguistic:_ environments_ that they appear semantically 
odd. Almost every discourse can contain such sentences as 
By "X 11 is meant 11 such and such," 
I Hant "X" to refer to such and such, or 
"X" is defined as 11 such and such. 11 
Sentences of this sort refer not to extralinguistic events but to the use of 
the linguistic item "X" within a discourse and establish a semantic convention. 
Let me refer to such sentences as meaning descriptions, "sm." Neaning descriptions 
often do take up large portions of political, private and scholarly discoursc~s 
and effectively override established meanings. 
Hhat I am therefore advocating is an adaptive lexical dictionary, in which 
meaning.descriptions can be incorporated after proper translation into respective 
canonical forms. 
Second, much of normal discourse reli.en heavily on implicit rules for the 
use of otherwise semantically indefinite linguistic items. For example, 
pronominal forms are almost: always used and perceived as having definite 
references that are understood in the context of other sentences. If statements are 
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to be taken as elements in a set without loss of their contents, i.e., if 
their semantic interpretations involving pronouns are isolated from their 
immediate linguistic environment, then pronouns have to be replaced by the nouns 
in the place of which they stand. Similarly, when a time sequence of events 
is implicitly referred to by the sequential order of. their linguistic repre-
sentations, a kernelization that loses those references may yield unwarranted 
inferences. Thus, although a language surely does not provide grammatical 
constructs above the sentence level, as Katz and Fodor correctly recognize, 
speakers do tend to use rather efficient referential constructs to disambiguate 
granunatically indefinite references. Rules based on such constructs clearly 
involve information outside the boundary of a sentence. The explication of 
such rules may be difficult, b<Jt their effective use is indispensable 1·1hen a 
discourse is to be transformed into a set of state and/or structure descriptions 
without loss of the relevant content of the discourse as a wl•ole. 
Third, the !<erne liza tion component has to account for a speaker 1 s ability 
to rephrase sentences or sets of sentences into a standard format. Semantic 
descriptions of both thei1~ operant and their transform are to remain equivalent 
(Chomsky, 1957; Harris, 1964). Some such transformations refer to kernelizations 
of a compound sentence, such as "he read an interesting book" ·-·----·--~-~ "he read a 
book and the book lias interesting," others produce information equivalent transforms 
of a !<erne 1 sentence, for example, "he drove the car" -----·)~ "the car 1-1as 
driven by him." But of particular importance are transformations that eliminate 
information 1-1hich is not representable in the formalized language of the 
analyst, and is thus irrelevant for the intended inferences. For example, an 
analyst 1-1ho is interested only in interrelations among actors referred to in 
a text may 1-1ant to reduce the information represented in t~<o sentences: 
A British diplomat 1-1as forcibly detained by Red guards as 
he was getting out of his car. He Has put on trial in the 
street and released after one hour of interrogation. 
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to "Red guards detained the British diplomat1" and "the British diplomat1 
was put on trial by red guards" or even further "(active) Chinese/ vs./ 
(passive) British." The adequacy of such paraphrases obviously depends not 
on linguistic considerations alone, but to a large extent on information about 
the referential nature of the formalized language used by the analyst. 
The function of the kernelization component may be shol'ln analogously to 
the· ·above by: 
f~l(sl)l r , dl (s)l dl (sz) ' dz (sl) 
, .. ,. dz:sz) l." dz(su) J stl' stz' ... ' st } 
. \- v. 
I ···' ·-··· ; .. ~ ( :~~~: sr2 ,. ... ' sr ; 1 . f 
d ; s ) r 
Vl! 
srn2 , sm ' I ... ' x) I • 
ldm(sl)) ldn (sz)_; z u) 
where the left side of the arrow denotes its input l'lhich takes the form of a 
concatenation, 11 ,·--...',' of the semantic descriptions of the sentences of the text 
and the output iR a set of state descriptions, structure descriptions and 
meaning descriptions. 
Powers an::l Limitations 
The granunar that I have been referring to is, to my knowledge, the only form 
that has -lead to computable algorithms. Although its current stage of formali-
zation is still too complex and computationally too expensive to show significant 
analytical advantages when compared l'lith the linguistic efficiency of speakers, 
the progress so far achieved is remarkable. But, since I am not primarily 
concerned with Hnguistics, let me give illustrations of some of the other 
components of discourse models, ho1·1ever primitive their current manifestation 
may be. 
In the few cases in which the output of kernelizat~ons .is actually written 
down, the transformation that accounts for it is achieved mostly by knoHledgeahle 
analysts and not by explicit processes. Hhile this step can then not he 
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considered an explicit analysis, it nevertheless exhibits its significance 
v1henever text is considered as having representational message characteristics, 
For example, Ole Holsti made use of a canonical statement format in which 
sentences representing actions and perceptions of actions of agents (within 
the international scene) could be recorded, The seven possible constituents 
of such state descriptions are: 
The perceiver 
The perceiver other than author of the document 
The perceived 
The acU on 
The object acted upon (other than an actor-target) 
The auxiliary verb ntodifier 
The target and incorporated modifier (North, et al., 1963: 137) 
If the relationE:hips expressed by a sentence coincide "ith those implied in 
the definitions of these facets, then the assumed content of the statement can 
be paraphrased and represented in such a canonical form, Thus the terms of the 
analyst's formalized language determine the kind of information that can be 
utilized for subsequent content inferences, 
In an ongoing international study of values in politics at the University 
of Pennsylvania, He undertook to rephrase relevant portions of political 
speeches to make the structure Hithin ;,hich political values are expressed 
available for subsequent inferences, (Krippendorff, 1966). Similarly, Collette 
Piault used a notational system consisting of sets of attributes, relations, 
references and tHo classes of objects in the terms of Hhich interview data 
could be represented for further processing. But the kernelization was in all 
cases done cognitively, i.e, by the intuition of an analyst, 
Regarding discourse logics, examples are fewer, Hhen the content of a text 
is represented in some canonical form other than simple categories, most content 
analysts go immediately into enumerations, and thus approximate the limitations of 
association models. One good example of a discourse logic, primitive but 
nevertheless convincing, is incorporated in Charles Osgood .!'.!. _al.' s Evaluative 
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Assertion Analysis (Osgood, Saporta and Nunnally, 1956). The canonical form 
of its state descriptions consists of two linguistic items referring to different 
objects and an expressed relation between them. The relation is regarded as 
associative or dissociative, and, the affective evaluation of one object is 
known, ·by attribution or othenlise , while the evaluation of the second must 
be inferred. This inference is accounted for by the congruity principle of 
affe·ctive cognition. The algebraic operations of the discourse logic which this 
principle suggests are fairly simple and explicit. They purport to represent 
some structural features of the system under consideration. 
\Vhile I regarded discom·ses as representative of states and structures of 
a source, they can quite often be considered as argumentative, in the sense that 
conclusions are developed and accepted more or less explicitly. Such discourses 
may reveal some aspects of the discourse logic underlying the use of references and 
contents, EdHin Shneidman, who made use of such information, suggested that there 
are individual differences in thinking·or cognitive maneuvers which may be 
manifested in the idiosyncracies of either deductive or inductive reasoning, in 
the form or the content of the (explicit or implied) premises, in logical gaps 
or unwarranted conclusions, etc. Under the assumption that each individual 
employs an "idiologic" that is both consistent and acceptable to him, it seems 
possible to infer the logical conditions under which idiosyncracies of reasoning 
and cognitive maneuvers appear rational. In doing this systematically, the 
analyst constructs a discourse logic or 11 contralogic," as he calls it, which 
"would be that theoretical logical system (l,hich might be operating unconsciously 
in the mind of the speaker) which Hould serve to undo or rectify or make 
reasonable the apparent idiosyncracies of the speaker 1 s logical posit ions. Its 
purpose is to permit (the analyst) to see what is required - what the speaker 
must implicitly believe - to logically "explain" the speaker's own special logic 
(Shneidman, 1963: 183). Although Shneidman uses these logical constructs only 
-29-
as an intermediate step to infer psychological traits, the work shows the need 
for discourse logics when an analyst considers verbal material as having 
referential contents. 
From the examples that I have been citing it is quite easily imaginable 
that a full formalization of discourse models may become too complex to be 
practicable. Even if an analytical procedure is reduced to a specific discourse, 
moilels of the ability of a reader to cognitively handle information about the 
subject matter of a text require considerable amount of theoretical comprehension 
before they can be put into algorithmic terms, Neve1·theless, I think this 
developu1ent of theory is a prerequisite for the design of computer programs 
that process the linguistic contents of volumes of verbal data automatically. 
I think the best example of a discourse ;,10del of messages Hhich has been 
fully computerized is described by Robert Lindsay (1963), It is too simple to 
be useful for practical analysis, but is excellently suited to demonstrate how 
discourse models of messages have to be constructed algorithmically. Robert 
Lindsay's program accepts only sentences in Ogd"Jl'.§. Basic English and is aimed at 
representing and making inferences about kinship relations, Such sentences as: 
Joey was playing 1;i.th his brother Bobby in their 
Aunt Jane 1 s yard Hhen their mother called them home 
are first subjected to syntactic analysis from which syntactic characterizations 
of their sentential structure is obtained, A semantic analysis subsequently 
searches for all expressions that connote kinship relations. Sentences that 
are relevant· according to this criterion are then kernelized and paraphrased 
to obtain state descriptions in canonical form of the type "Joey is brother of 
Bobby." The originally rich content of the discourse is thus reduced to the 
dimensions relevant for the intended inferences. The main objective of this 
work was to find an inferential memory that represented the discourse logic 
implicitly. Structural information about the source, the system of kin relations, 
was thereby assumed perfect, The discourse logic so constructed then accounts 
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for such inferences as from the additional sentences: 
Bobby's sister Judy married Edward. 
that Judy is Joey's sister, that Ed1vard is Joey's brother-in-law, etc. Thus 
giving a clear demonstration of some understanding of ,;hat the discourse is 
about. 
, .. The program also demonstrates another feature of discourse models that 
contrasts Hith association models. From the above sentences some uncertainty 
regarding Jane's exact position Hithin the kinship network still remains. But 
the reader is informed that Jane is either the sister of Joey's mother or sl,-:> 
is the sister of Joey's fatb.er, but not both. As Lindsay points out, it 
HOttle! be inappropriate to assume "a connection such that a given stimulus 1vill 
sometimes evoke one association, some times another on a probability basis,.,. 
(N)o reader Hould conclude half the time that Jane is the sister of Joey's 
mother and half the time that she is the sister of Joey's father, altering 
his decision from time to time" (Lindsay, 1963: 231). Hhi.J.e it is not at all 
unreasonable to consider logical interpretations of probabilities for discourse 
models, a frequency interpretation of probabili__t:y as required in association 
models would be entirely inappropriate here. 
Discourse models of messages, the structure of Hhich I have just characterized, 
are meant to represent a reader's ability to understand what a discourse is 
about. Hhile such models render a text infinitely more informative about a 
source than association models can ever accomplish, even if their formalization 
were accomplished, they are still limited on several grounds. Let me mention 
only two basic sources of procedural inadequacy. 
First, discourse models cannot handle the ki.nd of outside evidence that an 
informed reader may utilize in determining whi~h statements are true, invalid or 
indeterminate. To argue that a reader would reject a statement that appears 
contrary to experience has its analog in contradictions that may appear in the 
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discourse logic component. But to determine which of the contradictory statements 
• have to be accepted or refuted :requires inform')tion about those statemE)nt"., such 
as the credibility of the source, which discourse models cannot handle. The 
same inability rcfel'S to attitudinal propositions and quotations. The sentence: 
Brown said, "Red guards tried a British diplomat" 
for. example, is about Brm-m making a certain noise. That this noise can also 
be regarded as having content requires an additional level of discourse. 
Second, Hhcn a source aims at certain effects, statements may be primarily 
of an instrumental character rather than rept·esentative. In such situations 
discourse models may yield entirely inadequate results. AL·guing about the 
instrurnental usc of language, George Nahl enumerated the situations in which 
a child may utter "I am hungcy." It may be used when it is unwilling to go to 
bed, Hhen in need for attention, etc., and perhaps also when hungry. To consider 
the statement as referring to an existing state of hunger whenever it is uttered 
may be entirely misleading, (Nahl, 1959: 9Lf). The same situation exists for 
the analyst of ;wr propaganda Hho Hishes to infer Hhether 1·efcrred to reprisal 
weapons in fact exist (George, 1959: 148). Lir,s are af 1:er all the most extreme 
form of instrumental communications. If they appear in any shade, parti.cularly 
when consistent Hith the remaining content, inferences from a discourse model 
of messages are bound to be fallacious. 
CONHUNICATION NODELS 
The Domain of such Hodels 
Communications such as exchanged in interpersonal conversations, political 
dialogues and bet1·1een social institutions whether they arc regarded as propaganda, 
official documents, ultimata, treaties, conunands, expressions of compliance, etc., 
differ from discourses as considered above: in at least three fundamental ways: 
(1) Such communications, while undoubtedly employing certain references, are 
to a significant degree composed of sentences that do not convey a representational 
kind of information about states and the structure of a source. Questions, 
demands, requests, instructions, and greetings cannot be verified in the sm11e 
·way in which stnte clescript::..ons or structure descriptions can be verlficcl and 
can hardly be said to have content as far as discourse models are concerned. 
Yet such linguistic forms a1·e significant for the understanding of interactions 
among language users. Hhile sentences of this type do not primarily r':'prcsent, 
their content may become manifest to an analyst in reference to interactions among 
conm1unicators, 
(2) Even when such conununications have clear representational message 
characteristics, they may have to be viewed as instrumental in achieving certain 
objectives. Purpose is basic to all sources that can be attributed with some 
intelligence and in the case of human beings, instrumentality may enter all 
spheres of their overt behavior. Neither association models nor discourse models 
are po1verful enough to consider purposive verbalizations. For example, a guest 
who may vant to put his host in the position of offering him a drink by saying 
"it's really hot today'.' may or may not have made a true statement. But the 
assertion may trigger a behavioral trajectory that terminates at, among other 
things, the guest's obtaining a drink. If these consequences provide to an 
intelligent conununicator the criteria for making ehoices among instrumental 
verbalizations, then the analyst has to search for the content of messages in 
their possible sonseguences. 
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(3) Such corrununications can therefore be said to occur in situations comprising 
several conmllinicators, each pursuing its OHn objectives. The recorded text 
cannot then be considered a single consistent discourse but as representing a 
pattern of linguistic and non··linguistic exchanges between parties, ."! chronolog_y 
of interactions aHlong purposive corrununicators. Each of these exchanges is 
generated by one party and directed to other parties. Being a response to 
previous exchanges, each of them is assigned ."! point in tim" relative to each 
12 
other. The relevant context of sentences of ~he text has thus not only a 
linguistic dimension but includes the system of interactions and the changes in 
the parameter of such a system as well. 
Perhaps one can appreci"'1te the complexity of the som·ce with 1vhich 
communication models of messages have now to deal when imagining a chess-like 
gamel3 in which each player chooses his own objectives and has some advantage 
in not revealing it to the other, in Hhich rules are freely negotiable ·during 
the play and may indeed be violated, and in 1·1hich each party may Hant to put only 
few of its pmms on the board and is free to choose to talk about the position of 
the rest. All that the analyst obtains is the chronology of moves and verbal 
exchanges. Discourse models Hould merely infer Hhat paHns are being talked about. 
Association models HOuld be entirely inappropriate since much of Hhat is going 
on in the course of a play is not directly observable. Conununication models of 
messages, on the other hand, are expected to render the recorded verbalizations 
informative about the implicit and explicit rules that develop in the course of 
a play, about the pattern of compliance to these rules, about the objectives on 
Hhich each player may settle interdependently, and about the nature of the 
cooperative or competitive relation that may emerge between them. Thus, in his 
attempt to understand the system from the recorded exchanges, the analyst who 
makes use of communication models of messages may Hish at times to outwit the 
players' intentions, predict the consequences of their moves, and describe the 
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interlocking properties of the play ~;hich govern both the linguistic and non-
linguistic interactions. In other words, the analyst aims at inferring the 
structure of a dynamic system, its operating rules and controls fror~ the recorded 
linguistic exchanges between, and interactions among, potentially purposive 
conununicators. 
Analytical constRucts of conununicati.on situations that could render such a 
chl;·onology of interactions informative about the parameters of a dynamic system 
or, more specifically, models of messages that identify the content of linguistic 
exchanges wi.th the outcome of controls governing the interactions among purposive 
conmmnicators, are extremely complex and difficult to formalize, I cannot claim 
to have solved any of the pro:>lems associated with such models, nor do I believe 
that algorithmic solutions can be found within a short period of time except, 
perhaps, for the most reduced cases. Hy confidence in the possibility of 
constructing cmnmunication models of messages lies in the fact that intcll:i.gent 
conununicators continually usc communication conceptions '!;·Then either generating 
messages that have certain intended or unintentional effects or receiving and 
analy?.ing them in these terms. Even when those messages are exchanged between 
social groups or nations, analysts have been able to make rather reliable 
speculations regarding the patterns about which such messages may be informative. 
Systematic attempts to extract military intelligence from domestic war propaganda 
(George, 1959), the little published work of numerous foreign specialists who 
analyze diplomatic exchanges before adequate responses are formulated, and scholarly 
concerns with the possibilities of inferring whether the signatories of a 
disarmament agreement still confonn to their comHtments, (Singer, 1963) provide, 
if not examples of success, at least of reasonable hopes. I am therefore 
convinced that it may be possible to make progress regarding the understanding of 
conununication models of messages if at least some of their formal prerequites are 
clarified. I will start 1·1ith the instrumental frame of reference. 
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Requisite Information Hierarchies 
The last conference on content analysis, tHelve years ago, introduced the 
issue of instrumental comnmn:ications. Summarizing ho,.·7 far the discussion had 
gone, Ithiel de Sola Pool suggested four variables - the content (which 1·1as use.d 
almost interchangeably with our 'text~, it's authors internal states, his 
manipulative strategies, and the states of the universe. Huch of content analysis 
wa~· then concerned with making inferences from text to an author's internal 
states according to an association model. "Instrumental" Has attributed by 
Pool to "that Hhi.ch is manipulated (and thus varied in i.ts relation to the 
thing being inde:.<ed so as to achieve the author's objectives.)" Relying on t:his 
assoeiation model, the assertion of the independence of mai.lipulative str:ategies 
and internal states inl'lies the absence· of stable relationships bet1-1een text 
and internal states, thus making the task of the content analyst extremely 
difficult (Pool, 1959). 
Hany every·· day instn.unental acts refe1~ to the manipulation of r.ausc:l chaj_ns. 
Hishing to enter a house, a visitor may have several possible acts at his diposal. 
A particular choice among them ah1ays represents the outcome of complex cognitive 
processes. Only the behavior is observed, ho1-1ever - a particular button is 
pushed and entry to the house is granted if certain other conditions are 
satisfied. Although correlations bet1·1een objective (entering the house) and the 
observed instrumental act may be found, -it makes little sense to explain 
instrumental behavior that ,.Jay, 
I think the simpliest frame1-1ork capable of considering instrumental acts is 
one that regards the action of an agent in reference to his attempt to keep some 
essential states (1-1hi.ch may be subject to external disturbances) under control. 
At least the follo1-1ing may be distinguished: 
(a) T.he agent's essentia 1 states. 
(b) T.he voluntary strategies available. 
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(c) The perceivable environmental situations, 
(d) T:he agent's knoHledge about the changes in the essential states as 
a consequence of initiating certai11 strate~ies in given situations. 
(e) The agenL 1 s objective, a subset of the essential states. 
(f) A rationale (or principle of evaluation) for choosing among available 
strategies on the bases of the current essential state, the objective 
and the predicted consequences. 
Even if the situation is simple, the alternatives are finite and enumerable, 
and the environment of the manipulating agent is a strictly causal one, the 
analyst has to find not only a representation of the information the agent uses, 
but also a repre.sentat:i.on of the information the agent possesses about the 
consequences of his stratE:gi.es. Analytical cons true ts of instrumental behavior 
at once involve a hierarchy g[ ~ of information and their effective 
operationalizatiott. 
l-n1en the situation is such that the manipulating agent communicates verbally 
Hith other intelligent beings, his requisite knowledge increases tremendously in 
complexity. Even a rational child, for example, which considers lying to its 
parent will have to possess at least something equivalent to a discourse model 
that represents the parent's ability to understand its assertions. It will also 
have to have kno,.ledge about the parent's access to factual information about 
the subject matter plus kno1·1ledge about the behavioral consequences conditional 
on their possessing the kind of information the child is considering to produce, 
Hore involved is the situation of a congressman who Hishes to amend or to delete 
certain sentences from the Congressional Records. He has probably good reasons 
to take information about the English languagP. for·granted, but in order to 
assess the consequences of the sentences of his concern, the politician may have 
to consult his images about the political system •·lithin Hhich he sees himself 
interacting with his colleagues, with the administration, ;o~ith pressure groups 
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and with the public, Considering each of these potential recipients' expertise 
with the subject matter, their beliefs and valuc,s, he may have to estimate what 
message chara.cteristics these sentences may ha-ve for them. Considering furthe't' 
their objectives and possibilities to express their consent or dissent to the 
proposal, he may have to ascertain how their responses might detain or facilitate 
his own political future, etc. In short, the representative is considering a 
network of possible interdependencies among purposive political subsystems in his 
environment, each of which must be characterized by a hierarchy of types of 
knowledge. Even if the analyst wishes to make inferences only about the intentions 
of the child 1 s statement or n£ the politician's amendment or deletion, he wil.l 
have to have constructs that are at least as complex as the information the 
manipulating agent uses in making decisions among possible instrumental verbalizations. 
One of the erucial formal prerequisites of conununication models of messages 
involving purposive systems is therefore an adequate representation of information 
about information about information, g".t£· Such a hierarchieal structure already 
appears 'i·lhen statements are contrasted 'i·d.th information about >;·;rhat the statements 
claim to represent, The instrumental use of lies 'or inferences from apparent 
inconsistencies, as is typieal of much of political analysis of documents, 
presupposes the e.bility to handle such representational hierarchies of information. 
Such hierarchies can become extremely complicated i.n typically human interaction 
situations. In the information about the opponent that the agent employs may be 
imbedded the opponent 1 s information about the agent, as well as the information 
he possesses about the agent's information about him, etc. Representational 
theory handles such hierarchical structures only very clumsily. A J:"..<'IO.~J::\l.e 
formulation of "information about" has to my kno1~ledge not been developed. I 
believe that such a formulation is one of the prerequisites for constructing 
adequate conmmnication models of messages 1vhen conmmnicators can be attributed 
~1ith some intelligence. 
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Let me leave the recursive formulation of representational information as 
an open problem and turn to the nature of the consequences Hith \Vhich communica·· 
tion models ,;ill have to deal, particularly, to the form of the inferential 
argument for \11hich the analyst seeks structural information. 
Suppose the state descriprion "it's really hot today" is made at a party. 
Its factual content is quite trivial for it may be verified in reference to the 
present experiences of each participant. Neither is a unique motivation of the 
speaker immediately ascertainable from the statement alone nor is it likely that 
a unique behavior Hill follm·l. But the statement m!ly impose a particular 
constraint on the cons0quent interactions, leaving open a large class of 
appropriate illocutiona1·y rc~sponses. Hhile demanding some recognition of its 
receipt, the statement may stimulate an expression of consensus or disagreement 
among participants and may establish a situation in ·which the host recognizes 
his chance to demonstrate his hospitality. The likely consequence of the 
statement is not so much a particular response but rather the exclusion of a 
certain class of initially possible responses, leaving a wide variety of choices 
to the participants. Thus content, according to this model of messages, might 
be said to become manifest in the constraints imposed on a situation ~~ g 
..... ······~-.. - -
£_C!,!:!.~~q~~_eg~-~ of linguistic and non-linguistic exchrtnges. 
The content of instructions may be similarly considered. Whether they appear 
as rules of thumb, as sales guidelines or as national policies, their linguistic 
form can hardly be said to be descriptive of events or ideas. \111en Instituted, 
they have a profound effect on the organization and coordination of behavior by 
excluding certain trajectories and leavine others open for individual-and 
situation-specific interpretations. The content of explanatory frameHorks may 
likewise be assessed in terms of the structure they impose on the possible 
observations; the content of collective symbols may be seen to become manifest 
in their possibility to channel the diverse activities of individuals into a 
certain direction; and the content of political values can be regarded as becoming 
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evident in the kind of decisions they lcgi timize. S imilarl.y, lm·1s do not contain 
rules for good conduct but their content is negatively manifest by specifying the 
punishments that can 'be expe.cted '\\'hen criminal acts are exposed. Symbols, 
political values, and lm·7S no doubt make up much of 'l;\7hat is exchanged in a 
technologically advanced society. Such commurd cations do not have referents, but 
rnny impose constraints on the subsequent behavior. 
In their discussion of the instrumente.l use of language, ~lahl (1959) and 
Pool (1959) give the impression that the antecedent "intent" of purposive 
verbalizations differ from their descriptive contents only by being latent and 
non-conventionalized, I think, hoHever, that a consideration of messages as being 
informatjve about the direction of control of interactions by virtue of the 
constraints they impose on the possible consequences, differs from discourse models 
of messages in a more fundamental r..·1ay. 
The inferences that discourse models provide are usually r_osit;Lv_e in the 
sense that a given linguistic item refers, connotes or denotes a particular 
object or class of objects, and sentences describe particular states or structures 
in t~eir tenns. In contrast to this, communication models ah·1ays regard content 
inferences negatively: the observer of a dynamic system involving symbolic behavior 
will have to consider all conceivable alternative trajectories, and try to 
ascertain why a large number of them could not occur after certain linguistic 
expressions Here introduced so that the particular trajectory that was observed 
is one of those that was not excluded. The instrumental communicator within 
such a system of interactions will have to choose assertions that restrict the 
consequent acts in such a v1ay that the remaining free variation confroms to his 
objectives. Similarly, the message analyst attempts to make inferences from 
the recorded interchanges as to the nature of the constraints that either exist 
and thus govern the system of interactions, or are subsequently imposed on a 
situation, leaving undefined hoi·Jever, exactly which behavior will in fact 
occur and exactly 1·1hich internal states may have initiated the consequent constraint. 
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As Gregory Bateson remarked, the classical example of this negative form 
of inferences is the theory of evolution under natural selection. The theory 
suggests which Ol'ganLsms cannot be viable in a particula:t· ~nvironment but is 
unable to say Hhieh ones Hill actually emerge. He eoes on to say that: 
The negative form of these explanations is precisely comparable 
to the form of logical proof by reductio a<! absurdum. In this 
species of proof, a sufficient set of mutually exclusive alternative 
propositions is enumerated, e.g. 11 P" and 11 not P, 11 and the process 
of proof precedes by demonstrating that all but one of this set are 
untenable or "absurd." It folloHs that the surviving member of the 
set must be tenable Hithin the terms of the logical system. This is 
a .form of proof ~;hich the non-mathematician sometimes finds uncon-
vincing and, no doubt, the theory of natural selection sometimes 
seems unconvincing to non-mathematical persons for similar reasons -
~;hatever thooc reasons may be (Bateson, 1967). 
In the biological sphere, evolution by natural selection is an uni-
directional procoss: there is no feedback to parent generations. Instrumental 
conununications, and consequently, the control processes they establish within 
a system of inter·aetion, are critieally linked to conceiv_able. feedback loops 
of messagc->;s are not concerned. 
The child 1-1hich doesn't mind lying may consider giving a description of the 
events that not only structure its parent's perception but subsequently prevents 
the parent from imposing undesired restrictions upon the child. Often though 
the child is not sophisticated enough and considers only one such inferential 
loop Hhile the parent may consider further feedback loops to estimate the 
degree to 1·1hich the Gtatcmcnt may be trusted. Similarly is the congressman lvho 
subsumes his speech under political objectives bound to make his inferences 
along the circular floH of consequent events.. At each stage he may ·Hant to 
consider the extent to Hhich his speech imposes a constraint on the situation, 
what other constraints exist, and hoH the series of consequent constraints 
ultimately control his 01m variety of possible acts. 
Hhile state descriptions may be said to impose constraints on subsequent 
behavior as a secondary phenomenon, a large class of linguistic forms pertain 
primarily or exclusively to such constraints. This is particularly true for 
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demands, claims, treaties, etc. Demands may be "verified" by compliance and 
the content of demands thus becomes manifest i.n the system of interactions 
among at least tHo communicatcn·s, In particular situations, the assertion of 
demands implicitly or explicitly informs the recipient about rewards and 
punishment consequent to his choice of a particular behavior, and may force 
compliance hy making these conceivable consequences credible. The communication 
of demands cannot therefore reasonably be made unless it structures at least 
two interaction loops: 
consequent actE: 
>punishing effect 
In order to understand aad descri_be the structure of communication situations 
in "\oJhich linguistic exchanges dE:~ lennlne lhe paramc ters of the. interact ion, the 
task of the analyct becom2f; one of inferring from the chronology of exchanges 
the circular form of mutually i!J!posed and interLocking constraints, The form 
of content inference that communication models of messages are intcndecl to 
facilitate may therefore be said to be: 
1. Negative, i.e. it entails the ascertaining of the constraints imposed on 
a variety of possible consequences rather than the isolation of a 
particular trajectory, 
2. Circular, i.e. it is based on inferring the contents of linguistic 
exchanges along the possible chains of events each ultimately closing 
at their respective origins rather than on infen·ing in one direction 
only, and involves 
3. Analytical constntct~ oJ: control 1·1ith some order of prediction for 
rendering the recorded text informative about the interaction parameters 
of the source. 
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These circular inferences, which theoretically could go on .C!_~ I.nfinitm~, may 
find thei.r definite limit<>tion in the hierarchy of information that each party 
possesses about the information each other party posSesses etc. Once this 
information is exhausted in thi.s cireular extrapolation from past interactions, 
very little can be said beyond it. But practical limitations are more likely to 
set the limit on the understanding of the system of interactions: With each 
inferential loop the problems spiral to increasingly unmanagable propor·tions. 
Some Nanif~stati~ms of Cot_].~t_raint~ 
This peculi::1.r nature of the content inferences that communication models 
provide profoundly affect their possible validation. l·lhile there is no operdtional 
test for the procedural adequacy of discourse models (Chomsky, 1957), their 
performance can be at least checked against the ability of knowledgeable sp"akcrs 
of a language to understand what a discourse is about. Intersubjectivc agrccme.nt 
almost belongs to the very definition of 1l£bnguage. 11 The relations among 
conmn_micators th[lt develop in the course of verbal cxchances are, on the other 
hand, rarely so fnstituti.onali.zed and their assessment t"f~qnires considerable 
insights as far as the analyst is concerned. 
I mentioned that the recorded text can be regarded a chronology of exclwnges 
between communicators -Hhich are patterned according to time, place of origin and 
destination and may contain references across these exchanges as '\·lell. As 
Ross Ashby and Charles HcClelland suggest, the analyst, 1·1ho attempts to understand 
the source• s system of interaction, ·will have to infer from this rec:ord the 
existing and consequent constraints accounting for and imposed upon the nature 
of the source (Auhby, 1958; NcClelland, 1964). Difficulties arise out of the 
fact that this chronology represents only a single ·trajectory of interactional 
behavior and provides no obvious evidence of the trajectories that 1·1ere excluded 
in the course of the recoJ:ded process. Even 1·1hen the chronology covers a long 
period of time, the number of possible trajectories is often so large that they 
cannot be 11 acted out" systematica]Jy. \·n1en the interaction situation is 
. relatively stable, i.e., constraints are invariant, inferences about their 
existencC'.. still remain difficult. For example, if all citizens HDu1cl confine 
their behavior w:lthin li.m:i.ts that happen to be prescribed by law, it "ould neither 
be possible to ascertain the limits prescribed by la~-1 from the behavio1· observed 
nor could it bc; ascertained Hhether the laH is in fact effective. Simila·cly, 
a naive observer would have a hard time inferring the rules that are effective 
from the chess players 1 moves. In both cases 1 inguis tic and non-linguistic 
behavior may have to be consulted. 
I see essentially three Hays of obtaining ~viclen~~ fo:r the exj_stence of 
symbol:i.cally ind·uced constr.1ints, The h>.ast reliable inferences may be made. 
from explicit cowp liances to demands, from pledges or from conunitments, '1;·7hatE-.ver 
form they may take. Layman Allen, for example, showed hou many possibilities are 
h>ft open to the signatories of a segment of the nuclear test han treaty (Allen, 
1963). And the analysis of political values in decision mal<ing 1·1hich is proposed 
by Philip Jacob (Jacob, _g_to._a_!. 1962) is a similar attet>~)t to a.scertai.n const::aints 
on alternatives that arc~ accepted \·d. thin a source for whatever reasons. But: 
treaties may be 1nadc \·lith the implicit understanding that they can be broken 
and political values may be asserted 1-dthout making decisions accordingly. 'l'hus, 
if taken alone, the validity of this form of evidence is highly questionable. 
Evidence for the existence of constraints may, secondly, be found in th<e 
conmmnicator 1 s account of his insights about the e.xc luded alternatives, Private 
diaries by political decision makers often provide such information. For 
example, when choices among possible actions are justified in the light of the 
undesirable consequences that result from some of them, the severity of situational 
constraints reveal themselves quite clearly. The expressed insights of our 
thirsty guest at the party may similarly exhibit the nature of the existing 
constraints. He may reason like this: 1 1 will loose my stat us as a guest if 
caught grabbing a Hiskey bottle, I will be judged unrefined when asserting that 
I am thirsty; I cannot afford insulting the host by asking Hhy he didn't serve 
drinks, etc. 1 The assertion of a statement. \·7hich survives this negative form 
of reasoning Hill not reveal very much about the structure of the situ.at.:ton. 
Hhile this form of evidence may be particularly open to certAin interview 
situations ·Hhen couununicators vie,., their verbalizations instrumentally, the 
analyst rarely cc:n rely on it . 
. · The third form of evidence may be found in the consequences of violating a 
constraint hoHevet· it \·las introduced, This again exhibits the control aspect 
,.Jj_th ·which communication models are essentially concerned, It suggests that 
the seriousness of promises could be inferred from the consequences of not 
sticl<.ing to them; that the pm·Jel'.' of demands hecmncs evident in Hhilt follo\·78 from 
failures to comply; and that the reality of commitments appears in the condemnation 
of deviations. In the extreme, the assessment of the content of la·'i'l HOuld require 
to study the crimes that are identified and punished according to the text. 
This ,.,ould rcveaJ ,.,hich paragraphs are merely paper \·lithin a legal system anri 
\•lhich effectively limit the possible behavjors of citi%ens. Hhen less institutional·· 
ized fcrcms of interaction arE analyzed, the identification of incidents of 
violation and condemw=ttion is not ah·ntys an easy matter. Even the identification 
of provoc~tive and conciliatory moves involves a considerable amount of infol~mation 
about. the structure of control processes Hithin the source Hithout 1-1hich 
conmlUnication models do not yield adequate content inferences. 
I hope it is quite clear from my discussion that the analytical constructs 
of control processes involving higher orders of prediction from verbal interactions 
are very little understood and demand considerable investigative attention before 
rigorous message analytic procedures can be designed, There is no single form 
of evidence for the existence of controls affected by the linguistic and non-
linguistic exehanges. The analyst has to utilize all of them simultaneously and 
particularly consider apparent inconsistencies, violations and justifications in 
order to develop suitable constructs of control 1-1hich in turn Hill help him to 
assess the variety·~ limiting consequences of exchanges. Current attempts to 
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obLain evidence about contrc,l relations that emerge be tHe en nations, social 
organizations or individuals axe e"tther extremely reduced (to non-verbal 
int:er<tetJon) or re.l!lain OD_ the level of po~~-~ l_l.9c explanationn. Perhaps the 
HOd( of the Palo Alto group uhich recently presented a n:lce onalysis of the 
interactions depicted in Albee's !-nl<)'_,; AfxaicJ. _c>.f Y.irgLn_i" J·loolf (Hatdm1ick, e~·"!·, 
1967) could provide a starting point. 
Although I cannot point to any notev10rthy fonnalizati.on of conm1unication 
models of messages, they all involve extracting from a chronology of linguistic 
and non·-lineuj_stic exchanger; the_, follmving: 
(a:. information about the ident':i.ty of the .!:_€!.§ic_ s:.~~!~_!ll.!_0c~_t<?J:~~ of the source and 
their boundaries. 
(b) Informati.on about the .S..!c.l'ltes _of each conl]Jone_g_S of the source including the 
communicators 1 possible perceptions of the situation, their conununication and 
behavioral strategies, evaluative frameHorks and objectives. 
(c) tnformation about the tra_!_""I_~E~L~~i--~.!J. .facilit~J-e~, time delay~;> ch,;mnels and 
s t c1 b 1 c rc la lions be t'qcen t-hc~ c ontmurde:a tors. 
(d) Information about the existing constraints that have evolved in the course of 
previous interactions, i.e., the system's has:i.c operating rules and parameters, 
the definition of the situation and of the conmmnicators' roles, shared or 
not. 
(e) Information about the mechani~rns ,of control and the regulating p01·1er of 
the exchanged verbalization t·lhich structure those mechanisms, 
(f) lnfonnation about the hierarchical structure and quantity of knoHledg_E! 
available to the communicators about the possible dynamic interdependencies 
between the souyce 1 s components. 
Hith this information, the analyst may be able to develop a _specific model of 
the Conmmrd.cat ion situation j nvolving analytical cons true ts of control. These 
may render the recorded 1 i_nguin tic exchanges ·Hi thin a source infonna tive about the 
structure of interactjon and its dynamic consequences. 
CONCLUDING RENARKS 
Let me try to summariz:e some. of my points. I think it is 'important to 
conceptually abandon the idea of arw.ly;.-;ing ,!_he content of .~ m2ssa.ge. Content 
cannot be analyze.d but it may be inferred by an analyst in reference to some 
source against th2 behavior of Hhich eontent inferenees may be validated, 
·. · By defining .messag.§', ."Jlaly_c;is as ."12.)': scientific:: ,11!§.thod for making ."J'eci.f:Lco 
content:: .tnference" fro_111 reco1:ded text I \olish to emphasize that it is the 
analys_.t_ to 'dhom a text may become informative nbout unobserved states) events 
or phenomena of the sol...o:ce; furthermore, analytical construct13 for making 
the inferences ~t~~~-!J~ bE~ .§.~Ji/-)~.i~ and open to c1e.tailec1 examination inUependen't 
of the particular situation in Hhich they are applied. Hhere explicit techniques 
are merely analytical aids and the crucial process of making inferences i.s left 
to the insights ancl cognition of a human analyst, I sug3est that the term "message 
analysis" be avoided. 
The choice of a particttlAr analytical construct for the analysis of messages 
evidently implies certain assumptions regarding the nature of the source. This 
raises the important question of the adequacy of such constructs in particular 
situations, But regardless of whether such questions are answered affirmatively 
or not three prototypes of analytical constructs or basic models of messages seem 
to be distinguishable. I referred to them as association !~odels, discou~--"-" models 
and _c.'.'J1'1_nunic1l_tion !''().clels respectively. Theit· crucial difference appears (a) in 
the assumptions made about the structure of the source, (b) in the kind of informa-
tion relevant for designing the required analytical procedures, (c) in the struct-
ure that is initially imposed upon the input data when recording them, (d) in the 
message characteristics that the data acquire in the course of the analytical pro-
cess, i.e., the inferred c\mtent, and (e) in the kind of evidence required for 
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verifying the content inferen.ces made. tet me represent these differences 
tabularly in Figure. 4 Hithout rcvicHing them in detail. 
Hith this differentiation I do not wish to imply that such modele: provide 
mutually exclusive alternatives for an analysis. Conununication models often 
presuppose and incorporate the information provided by both discourse modele 
and association wodels. If it is compatible Hith an analynt 1 s inferential ajm 
then the statistical operations of association models may Hell be applied sub· 
sequent to the algebraic operations of a discourse logic. However, the analytic-
al functions of these models, their logical possibilities and limitations should 
be understood. 
If one prefc'l'S semiotic tenninolo8y such as that of Charles Pierce (Burks, 
1949) then one would probably have to say that association models consider a text 
as a set of "ind:Lces, 11 discourse models regard a text as a pattern of 11~mbol~11 
while the vieH of coinmunication moclcls t·Jould have to remain unlabeled althour;h 
subsmnable under the r.:!:'.~JQ!!~.t~£ branch of the theory of signs. But this apparent: 
congruency Hith t;emiotic terminology is only a superficial one and may become 
misleading when spc-~cific investigative techniques .are discussed. If one shares 
the semioticists 1 search for the relations accorUing to which symbols are inter.--
preted then one I·Tould have to say that association models are concerned 1·lith 
correlational dependencies, causal or not; discourse models deal with systeme of 
linguistic references, denot:a tions or connotations; and communication models con·~ 
sider ~_ntro.ls or interactional co:Q_seg~Ienc~:...~. But these are only convenient labels. 
I do think that the concern tvith models of messages is more productive for 
the study of sod.al communication than the semiotic approach has been. This is 
because the former aims at representing pnt'tial theories of.§! source, i.e., j_ts 
symbolic processes, 1·1ith which the latter has not been able to deal. Let me give 
just one example of the confusion that results from such global labels as "symbol" 
and its 11 interpretat:i.on." At a recent confc.rence, Jurgen Ruesch and Samuel 
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Eisenstadt got into an interesting argument about Hhether B. system of symbols, in 
order to be effec.:tive within <1. society, require homogeneous or heterogeneous inter-
pretations. Ruesch exemplified his po:int by referring to Lraff:ic signs the hete:r_·u-
geneous interpreta t i.on of wld ch \•Jould result in disastrous traffic ace ident s. 
Eisenstadt, on th2. other hand) refer1:ed to 11 The Rock of Israel 11 \V.hich is knoun to 
connote quite a number of things to different citizens of Israel 'I·Jithout making 
the .. symbol less poHerful in regard to the national identity it promotes (Thayer, 
1967: L,73-L,76). It seems that it is just because the intent to survive the 
traffic is shared by a population of drivers vlith approximately equal poHer to 
influence the situation that the interpretation of traffic signals can be recluced 
to discourse models. Hhen a political sycuhol j s chosen to organize. and channel a 
large variety of different activities, each guided by potentially different c•bjcct·· 
ives, such reduction may not be appropriate. In each case the term 11 int:erpretation11 
has to denote quite different processes although all 1nay involve inferences as to 
;~hat the symbol relates to. 
Only in part have I mentioned the r_ossi£>_g:ic~.Y. of .".'c'-I_"J'..''.!ce_ti_;dng these models, 
Let me make only n fe~·J comments on this problem, Regarding association models, I 
see no serious obstacles. Computer programs for statistical procedures are easily 
available althou~t not all of them accept verbal data as inputs, In this respect 
the pioneering ;~ork done by Philip Stone et l'.1· (1963; 1966) should be mentioned. 
Regarding discourse models the situation does not look as favourable. Pro-
grams providing semantic characterizAtions of natural language sentences currently 
require·an undue amount of time and their results are not ahvays useful. In order 
to come to more practical algorithms it is probably advisable to accept goals that 
are less ambitious than those considered by linguists, But even if the obstacles 
of such semantic characterizations ,.,ere removed, I suggest that it is impossible 
to expect general algorithms for the analysis of all conceivable discourses, The 
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information that would have to go into such a discourse logic would have to 
represent all a speaker knoHs about the world, But I do believe that it is possible 
to develop discourse logics for limited dontaitlS or specialized subject matters, 
the structure of \·Jhich is knm'ln or not too involved, Kinship relations is but a 
primitive example of certain list structures into t<7hich other discourses may be 
mapped as well, Available simulation languages may set limitations for such con-
tent inferences. I see the formalization of specialized discourse logics and com-
patible kernelization procedures as the most important step tm·1ards inferring a 
text's referential content. 
I think, the problems of computerizing communication models of messages a-re 
extremely difficult to solve, Clearly, their formalization presupposes both ade-· 
quate association models and adequate discourse models, But I 1-1onder if the cur-
rently available soft1-1are is capable of representing systems of linguistic and 
non-1 inguist ic exchange:;; among intelligent comHlunica tot·s, Perhaps this kind of 
message analysis is bound to be made by human analysts ,.,1ho eRn specify the con-
straints of a sittiation more easily using computers merely as aids for concepttJali-
zation, Even the most reduced attempt to formalize cormnunication models of 
messages HOttld be a great step forward. Hhether this is possible at all I am unable 
to judge, 
Let me close by suggesting that much of our concern with the content of 
messages is to discover the non-obvious, to infer 1vhat is hi.clden, to gain inform-
ation about what cannot be seen, and to make messages out of signals that remain 
signals for others. It always requires an analy_tical sophistication that is great-
er than that possessed by the source. If analysts reduce the power of their analyt--
ical facilities for the sake of efficiency, or in compliance with narrm·7 scientific 
standards, then their inferences may become quite misleading. Almost always is it 
possible for an intelligent source to outwit an analyst Hith a reduced repertoire 
-51-
of models of messages by relying on a way of concealing or conveying signific,ont 
information that is more pOI·Jerful than his models cern handle, It is for this 
reason that I call for a thorough examination of the adequacy of available analyt-
ical constructs of messages. in the light of knm·!l1or conceivable sources of 
information. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. It should be noted that I usc "source" to denote any kind of system that is 
identifiable by i.ts variables in the analyst's envi~onment and of which some 
information is available. A source in this sense includes a situation in 
which b;.Jo human communicators or social organizations interact through tile 
exchange of signals or massages. Such situations are often described in 
terms of "source" or 11 sender) 11 ''transmitter" and "receiver.'' The term "source" 
as used in this paper is not limited to the dcnotat:ion of single conmmnication 
agents that are identified because of thei:c sending signals to some other 
·.··agents; it is more general. 
2. Someti_mes 11 meaning11 is understood to refer to the rules account:i.ng for the 
use of sign-vehicles or signals in particular contexts. An object that 
po~·sess_es meaning in this sense may be said to be one for \·lhich a receivL~r 
has some sucl1 rules, The arrow in the diagram then denotes that particular 
meaning whicl.• relates a received signal (the raH data) to some contents 
(the inaccessible states of tl1e source) an~ througl1 whj_ch messages are re~l-· 
ized. Although tl1c genc1alizcd message an2lytic process can be quite adeqttatc·· 
1y depicted by the process: 
\vhen the recci.vE~cl signals are members of a language--like system of represent·· 
ations, 11 mE.~aning 11 has been taken to refer only to a part of this inferential 
process. 
3, This definition deviates in several respects from definitions of content analys-
is of ,.,hich the one attr:ibutcd to Berelson is by far the most popular: "Content 
analysis is a research technique for the objective> systematic, and quantitative 
description of the manifest content of communications" (Berelson and Lazarsfeld, 
191•8: 5). By leaving the crucial term "content" undefined, the definition fails 
to delineate the empirical domain of the technique. References to "objectivity," 
"system," and "quantification" merely stipulate that the technique conform to 
scientific standards. 
Among the most recent definitions is the one proposed by Ole Holsti ,;hich 
reads: 11 Conte<Ot analysis is any technique for systematically and objectively 
identifying specified characteristics of messages" (Holsti, 1966:7). Here 
the process of making specific inferences ,;hi.ch probably offers the most cruc-
ial distinction between treating data as observations, and treating data as 
messages about unobserved phenomena, is not recognised. Content analysis is 
then often reduced to a technique for characterizing the occurrences of the 
constituent elements of a text. The significance of content inferences has 
been emphasi.~ed by Alexander George (1959), Charles Osgood (1959:36) and 
George Gerbner (1958:86). 
4. A good example is the use of factor analytic techniques. The process typically 
involves the follm.1ing: First, a text is scored on many dimensions, each of 
which is intuitively meaningful and named in accordance with the analyst's 
conceptions, Second, an explicit statistical procedure is applied which 
identi.fies correlational clusters or factors, Third, the analyst attemptsto 
make sense out of these clusters of dimensions and tries to find suitnble con-
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cepts and accompanying nautes based upon inspection of the semantic inter-
pretations of these dimensions that constitute the cluster. The explicit 
procedure merely climi.nates correlntlonal redundancies, The r.·my this is 
nccompl.ished has very little to do with scmanl:ic processes or t!1ose of 
cogrtitiott, The difficuJ.t job of a seinatltic irtterpretation of the results 
is tl1en entirely left to the analyst's intuition, 
5, Hhat L call observational adequacy should not be confused Hith reliability 
as meast•red by the amounl of agreement achieved during a recording process, 
Reliability is a prerequisite of analytical success but it docs not in any 
r,vay assess r.·Jhether significant information· is maintained during a recordin'g 
~ .. process, 
6. Informativeness 1vithin association models can be given a more precise notion· 
by means of· Shannon's information theory. If C is the set of possible con-. 
tents of interest to the analyst, and Hm(C) is the partial conditional en-
tropy ih C,. the particular measu·rc m being kno,,Jn, lhe information I 
that m conveys about C is 
I = U(C) - II (C) 
Ill' 
7, In terms of information theory (see footnote 6) this is due to the fact that 
'Hhichever twc measures m1 and m2 are given 
H (C) - ll,n (C) 
1 
H (C) - lim m (C) 
1 2 
8. This has been the main argument of the transformationel school of linguistics, 
particularly of Noam Chomsky (1957), for a recursive description of grammar. 
9. It should be remarked thnt 1·7henever traditjonal content analysis aims at 
describing the manifest content in the autho:r: 1 s language, such a sit:uat ion in 
fact' exists, Hhen such content analyses follo1oJ purely descriptive aims -even 
logical implications arc supposedly excluded, 
10. This point is reflected in L~sz~Antal's Hork. He argues that the sentence: 
"The sum of the angles of a triangle is 180 degrees," is meaningful to 1·1hoever 
is able to give a semantic description of the sentence just on the basis of 
the knoHledge about the use of its constituent \'lords and their relative syn-
tactical pos·it:ions. But for an understandi.ng of Hhat: the sentence is about, 
i.e .. ; for a comprehension of its content, other than ~inguistic knmvledge -is 
requirecl,c' Evidently, an English speaking child may be able to describe the 
sentence semantically Hithout understanding it, The ability to semant.ically 
describe a, sentence is a prerequisi.te for i.ts understanding, "The purpose of:• 
the sentence,. and indeed that of language as a '\·Jhole, is to convey content, 
and both form and meaning (syntax and semantics) are the means to achieve thiE; 
end" (Antal, 19b4: 24), 
11, In a discuss,ion of "grammatical meaning" Roman Jacobson reports that "Dell 
Hymes·act,tally found an application for this sentence in a senseful poent 
· Hritten in 1957 and entitled 'colorless Green Ideas Sleep Furiously'" 
(Jacobson, 1959: ll1lf), 
12, ·n should be noted that several studies have recorded the direction of exchanges. 
In his cano~1ical recording format, Ole Holsti recognizes at least the producer 
of the statements and the perceiver of the situation to Hhich they refer.(North 
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et .'1} . • , 1963: 137), Another way of recording interactions is suggested by 
Elihu Katz _(!!:_ .':'.l· \·lho proposes to analyze the nature of persuasive appeals 
that clients of a fonnal organization use· i.u support of requests for serv-
ices. The six-faceted canonica.l fon11 includes the clients 1 perceptions of 
his role in relnti.on to that of the formal organization. (Katz, .<et aJ, 1967). 
Such ways of recording do not necessarily produce cltronoloBies of interaction 
of the kind comn1unication models reqdire, particularly when the verbalizations 
of only one party arc considered and ·when the order of the exchanges is ne·· 
glected so as to make the text amenable to statistical description. 
13. In a standard game of ct1ess verbalizations exchanged between experienced 
.. players are irrelevant to the game, Rules are not negotiable and in forma-
. tion about the state of the play is always perfect, Communication models 
of messages would hardly be appropriate, 
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